A Short Overview of the Events Surrounding the Jackson-Frost Conspiracy

Before diving into the documentary evidence, an overview of the situation and events of the Secession Crisis period is in order. Even here though, we will have to tightly focus on events directly surrounding the planned attack in St. Louis, and expand to other issues later.
The bullet-points below are not exhaustive, instead providing some of the key issues surrounding the Conspiracy, and ending with the Capture of Camp Jackson (an event which is really only the end of the beginning for Missouri’s internal tragedy). There is a great deal of vital and nuanced detail absent, information necessary to understand the environment that made these events possible…and possibly even inevitable considering the personalities involved. That detail will come later, as we examine large numbers of period documents, allowing the parties involved speak for themselves. But until then, a few of the high points by way of introduction.

Note: In 1861 St. Louis was the eighth largest city in the United States. It was a booming metropolis lying on the fault line of North and South and contenting with Chicago to become the “great metropolis of the west”. Control of the city would have a major, even a decisive, effect on the campaign in the Western Theater. A Confederate St. Louis would have been second only to New Orleans in population (with St. Louis’ 160,773 far outstripping Richmond’s population of 37,910). As an industrial center, St. Louis had no Confederate peer, with an economic output twice that of New Orleans or Richmond. Added to that, St. Louis’ controlling position at the junction of the Mississippi and the Missouri Rivers made the city a prize worth struggling for to both sides in the approaching war.

St Louis Allen Iron Works

Key findings of the Missouri Secession Crisis Project include:

  • Finding of Fact: From January 1861 Governor Jackson and his allies examined a variety of methods to take Missouri out of the Union. This included repeated attempts to pass a version of a “Military Bill” which would have placed the state on an effectively martial law footing and granted the governor, as Commander-in-Chief of the state forces, near dictatorial powers.
    • These had failed to pass in the January-March timeframe, because Jackson had only a plurality of “Breckinridge Democrat” supporters in the General Assembly. A coalition of Douglas Democrats, Bell-Everett Unionists, and Republicans cooperated to block the passage of the various military bills at that time.
  • Finding of Fact: While Governor Jackson was elected in late 1860 as the “Douglas Democrat” (due to a deal between the two factions of the “Missouri Democracy”) privately he was contemptuous of his (nominal) Conditional Unionist allies considering them “base submissionist[s]”.
  • Finding of Fact: Key secessionist actors did not trust each other and did not inform each other of their views or planned intentions. This was especially true of Governor Jackson, Lieutenant Governor Thomas C. Reynolds, Colonel Thornton Grimsley and former Governor (and future Major General) Sterling Price. This led to these secessionist leaders often operating at cross purposes and mutual (if sometimes unintended) sabotage.
    • A core of cooperating secessionists seems to have included: Governor Jackson, Secretary of State Benjamin Franklin Massey, MVM Adjutant General Warwick Hough, MVM Brigadier General Daniel M. Frost, Thomas Lowndes Snead, and (usually) the leaders of St. Louis’ Minute Men pro-secession paramilitary organization.
  • Finding of Fact: Despite the state’s official policy of “armed neutrality” (inherited from Jackson’s predecessor Governor Robert M. Stewart), from February-May 1861 Brigadier General Daniel March Frost, MVM, worked with the St. Louis’ pro-secessionist “Minute Men” para-military organization to establish new “all-secessionist” companies and regiments in the 1st (St Louis) Military District.
    • On or about 13 February, 1861 General Frost began swearing in companies of “Minute Men”, which he consolidated in a new “All Secessionist” 2nd Regiment MVM. This process also provided the Minute Men legal standing to organize militarily, and the cover of a government association when they intimidated St. Louis Unionists.

      Berthold Mansion Minute Men Headquarters, Courtesy of the Missouri History Museum

      Berthold Mansion
      Minute Men Headquarters,
      Courtesy of the Missouri History Museum

    • Subsequently, during the May Militia Drill, the “Minute Men” headquarters (the Berthold Mansion at 5th and Pine) was employed as an official auxiliary Militia recruiting station, and organized companies were marched from that location to Camp Jackson for consolidation into the Militia and training.
    • Note: The long-standing 1st Regiment MVM began to come apart during the secession crisis, with component companies losing personnel or disbanding. This seems to have been the result of a number of factors, but primarily due to concerns by some Unionist members of the militia that the Governor or General Frost would call upon the militia to act against the Federal government. The disbanded companies in the 1st Regiment were replaced by new companies established under General Frost’s administration.
  • Note: The senior Federal military official in St. Louis was the 60-year old Brigadier General William Selby Harney, commander of the Department of the West, which was headquartered at St. Louis. Harney was loyal to the Federal government, but had long and deep ties to key pro-secessionists in St. Louis (General Frost was an in-law). He attempted to tamp down friction in St. Louis, but because these actions usually involved preventing “provocative” defensive measures related to the Arsenal, he was considered dangerously naive, if not treacherous, by key Missouri Unionists. They made their views clear in a series of letters to President Lincoln and members of his cabinet.
    Brigadier General William S. Harney

    Brigadier General William S. Harney

    • For much of the Secession Crisis the Arsenal itself was managed by Brevet Major Peter V. Hagner, of the Ordinance Department. St. Louis Unionists considered him to also be dangerously inactive in preparing the Arsenal for defense.
    • Captain Nathaniel Lyon, 2nd Infantry had arrived at the Arsenal with a company of infantry in early February. A Free Soiler, Lyon had become strongly opposed to militant pro-slavery activists during his time in Kansas. He became associated with the anti-secession activists of St. Louis’ “Union Club”. Concerned about the potential threat to the Arsenal he consulted on Unionist underground military training. At the request of St. Louis Unionists, on March 13 the War Department appointed Lyon commander of Arsenal defenses, but not the Arsenal itself. The control of the facility and its contents were still in the hands of Major Hagner. Lyon fell under the direct supervision of General Harney, as Department commander. Harney could, and did, personally intervene to modify or prevent Lyon’s defensive measures.
  • Finding of Fact: Shortly after the March 31, 1861 adjournment of the Missouri General Assembly (apparently on or about April 10, 1861) Governor Jackson traveled from Jefferson City to St. Louis for secret conferences with civilian and military advisors (“some of the most active secessionists of the city”) discussing (notwithstanding the State Convention’s March 21 rejection of secession) a planned attack on the U.S. Arsenal at St. Louis and the secession of the state.
    • Participants reportedly included: Governor Jackson; General Frost; Judge William M. Cooke; John A. Brownlee, President of the St. Louis Police Board; and Colton Greene and Basil Wilson Duke of the Minute Men. Also likely present was MVM Adjutant General Warwick Hough. Lieutenant Colonel John S. Bowen, MVM may also have been there, but evidence is more contradictory.
  • Finding of Fact: At the St. Louis Conferences, it was agreed “that the first thing to be done was to seize the [U.S.] Arsenal” at St. Louis. BG Frost was charged with writing up a post-meeting “memorial” discussing the how the Arsenal could be captured. Frost did not complete the document until April 15.
    • Note: According to the scholarship of Dr. Randy McGuire, PhD, the St. Louis Arsenal had the largest holdings of infantry weapons of any Army depot in any southern or western states, with approximately 36,600 small arms of all types. It also had a small number of field guns, perhaps ten or so.
      • General Frost likely believed that the Arsenal held about 40,000 small arms. This was the number given him by the friendly Major William H. Bell, USA during a conversation in late January, 1861
      • In January 1861, an inventory of MVM weapons by Quartermaster General James Harding stated that Missouri possessed approximately 2,300 rifles and muskets and 60 carbines state-wide.
    • Note: While question of arms was a major one, and was the subject of a large volume of correspondence between both Unionist and secessionist activists, the Arsenal played a more important role as THE center of Federal and Unionist activity in the state. While the Headquarters of the Department of the West was theoretically located at General Harney’s house in the city, by April most Federal military activity had become centered on the secure Arsenal grounds. The Arsenal was also the focus of civilian Unionists who looked to it as the main outpost of Federal (military) authority in the state. In the event of secession, or MVM action without legal secession, the Arsenal would likely become a focus of resistance by Unionist Missourians.
  • Finding of Fact: While the meeting and decision to attack the St. Louis Arsenal occurred prior to the attack on Ft Sumter (April 12, 1861), Frost had not yet completed his “memorial” when hostilities commenced in South Carolina. The memorandum was finally submitted o Jackson on April 15, 1861. The document is written as if it was the first instance that the two had discussed the Arsenal, although the the Governor and his military commander had already agreed to attack the facility. It is possible that the “memorial” was intended as a “memorandum for the record”, which could be released to the public to justify a subsequent to an attack on Federal forces.
    BG Daniel M. Frost , MVM Courtesy of the Missouri History Museum

    BG Daniel M. Frost , MVM
    Courtesy of the Missouri History Museum

    • Notwithstanding the fact that the accommodating and non-confrontational General William S. Harney still commanded at St. Louis, Frost described the Arsenal as a clear and present danger, which could blockade or bombard the city. He then went on to propose a broad state-wide political-military strategy for “state defense”:
      1. Reconvene the General Assembly to pass new military-related legislation “for the purpose off placing the State in a condition to enable you to suppress insurrection or repel invasion”.
      2. Seek siege artillery from “the Governor of Louisiana….or other points”. The guns were eventually requested from the C.S.A. government at Montgomery and the State of Virginia. Unstated in the document, but implied by the phrase “erect batteries” in Point Five below, is that the artillery was to be used to reduce the St. Louis Arsenal.
      3. Send an agent to Liberty, Missouri “to see what is [at the auxiliary U.S. arms depot] there and to put the people of that vicinity on their guard” to prevent its garrisoning or the removal of arms by Federal personnel. Only five days later, on April 20, local militia from the Liberty area did seize the arms depot, sharing the weapons with the Quartermaster General James Harding of the MVM.
      4. Called on Governor Jackson to make a public announcement stating that Lincoln’s call for volunteers (after the attack on Fort Sumter) was illegal, that Lincoln intended to arm Missourians to resist the state government, and that the population of Missouri should prepare to resist Federal attempts at coercion.
      5. He called on Jackson to order him (Frost) to “form a military camp of instruction at or near the City of St. Louis to muster [new] military companies into the service of the State, to erect batteries [on the heights commanding the Arsenal], and to do all things necessary and proper to be done to maintain the peace, dignity, and sovereignty of the State.” This last item was in line with the course of action decided on during the St. Louis meetings; that the Arsenal would not be attacked by infantry, but instead would be reduced using heavy artillery, emplaced under the guise of militia military engineering exercises.
      6. Finally Frost called on the Governor to order the St Louis troops then deployed the Kansas border, including the state’s only organized battery of artillerists, to return to St. Louis.
  • Finding of Fact: General Harney learned of the planned attack almost immediately.
    • On April 17 Harney wrote the Head Quarters U.S. Army at New York to inform his superiors that “the arsenal buildings and grounds are completely commanded by hills immediately in their rear and within easy range. I learn from sources which I consider reliable that it is the intention of the executive of this State to cause batteries to be erected on these hills and also upon the island opposite the arsenal. I am further informed that, should such batteries be erected, it is contemplated by the State authorities, in the event of the secession of the State from the Union, to demand the surrender of the arsenal.” He noted that while the small garrison present “would probably be able to resist” an infantry attack, “it could not withstand the fire of the batteries situated as above indicated.” Unsure of his proper course he stated “under these circumstances I respectfully request instructions for my guidance.”
    • Of additional interest is that fact that General Harney states only approximately 140 of the 430 men present in the Arsenal garrison were trained soldiers (from the 2nd and 4th Artillery and the 2nd Infantry) the rest having been recruits transferred (at the request of General Winfield Scott) from nearby Jefferson Barracks to deter possible attack on the Arsenal’s normal caretaker garrison.

      Basil Wilson Duke, Commissioner to the CSA Courtesy, Missouri History Museum

      Basil Wilson Duke, Commissioner to the CSA
      Courtesy, Missouri History Museum

  • Finding of Fact: On April 21, 1861, Colton Greene and Basil Wilson Duke (leaders of the Minute Men organization), Commissioned as Captains and Aides-de-Camp, MVM, and acting as Commissioners (Ambassadors) from Governor Jackson, met with President Jefferson Davis and his cabinet at Montgomery. The Governor’s two envoys requested siege artillery to use in attacking the St. Louis Arsenal and carried out preliminary talks to lay the ground work for (in Governor Jackson’s view) Missouri’s subsequent entry into the Confederacy.
    o President Davis agreed to support the attack and provided Duke and Greene with a letter to the Commandant of the Baton Rouge Arsenal, instructing that officer to provide the two Commissioners with the artillery for transfer to Missouri.
  • Finding of Fact: On April 22, 1861 Missouri Adjutant General Hough ordered a statewide militia muster to be held on/around the first week in May. According to one conspirator, the state-wide muster was substituted for Frost’s original “St. Louis-only muster”, because massing troops only in St. Louis would have signaled Governor Jackson’s intent to attack the Arsenal.
  • Finding of Fact: The Lincoln administration was in continual receipt of reports on the tense security situation in Missouri from a variety of sources:
    • Directly though local Army and other Federal officials
    • From Missouri Unionists reporting through Postmaster General Montgomery Blair and Attorney General Edward Bates
    • Direct to Lincoln and the War Department from Missouri Unionists
  • Finding of Fact: Captain Nathaniel Lyon carried out all acts only within bounds set down by official orders from the War Department and by exercising only the authorities delegated to him.
  • Finding of Fact: There were contending quasi-official intelligence networks operating in St. Louis, and both the Unionist and Secessionist networks achieved almost perfect success in identifying the activities and intent of the other. The eventual outcome of the crisis seems to have been a product of a failure of unified command on the Secessionist side, and a failure of General Frost to believe the intelligence provided him on May 9, 1861.
  • Finding of Fact: General Harney was removed as Commander of the Department of the West at St. Louis due to longstanding concerns about his conciliatory attitude toward Missouri’s secessionists and his apparent lack of concern (or fatalism) concerning the pending attack by the MVM. The proximate cause for the general’s removal was his action countermanding an order from the War Department to Captain Lyon to arm “Loyal Citizens” at St. Louis.
    • Note: Harney’s previous behavior makes it likely that he viewed the arming of Unionists as provocative to local secessionists. The General likely should have considered the order to Lyon as binding on him as well, or at least sought guidance from the War Department before contradicting it.
    • In the April 21 message to Lyon informing him of Harney’s removal he was instructed: “General Harney has this day been relieved from his command. The Secretary of War directs that you immediately execute the order previously given to arm the loyal citizens, to protect the public property, and execute the laws. Muster four regiments into the service.” Over the next weeks Lyon did so, mustering local Unionists into Federal service as the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Missouri Volunteer Infantry (Three Months Service).
      • While mustering these volunteers directly into Federal service (without state permission) violated the Federal Militia Act of 1795, the Supreme Court later upheld the legality of such actions by Lincoln under his war powers as Commander-in-Chief in wartime.

        John A. Brownlee President of the St. Louis Police Board

        John A. Brownlee
        President of the St. Louis Police Board

  • Finding of Fact: On April 24 the St. Louis Police Board, which controlled all state military and police forces in St. Louis…and was largely composed by Jackson-appointed secessionists…ordered the formation of two volunteer military companies in each of St. Louis’ ten wards to “suppress mobs or riots, and to protect the lives and property of the people”. These Police Board “Home Guards” were not to be sworn police officers, but instead were to be organized and trained as infantry. This order had the effect of creating twenty new companies (two regiments) of state infantry in St. Louis. Because the Police Board could issue orders to Frost’s militia as well as the police, all these state forces could potentially act seamlessly.
  • Finding of Fact: In late April, MVM Quartermaster General James Harding began an effort to purchase all available militarily useful weapons and other supplies in St. Louis and other locations in and round the state.
  • Finding of Fact: On the evening of April 25, on the Authority of the Police Board, troops of the First Regiment MVM conducted a nighttime raid, at the request of Quartermaster General Harding, to seize the gunpowder powder at the civilian powder magazines of the Laflin and Hazard companies in northern St. Louis. Although this was publicly described as a “purchase” or an act to “protect” the gunpowder, Harding described it as a “forced purchase” and stated the men of the(1st Regiment’s) St. Louis Greys and the Washington Blues broke open the magazines and took the powder by force. The majority of the powder was immediately loaded on the steamers ISABELLA and AUGUSTUS MCDOWELL and sent up the Missouri to Jefferson City where Governor Jackson personally received and congratulated the militia who had traveled onboard to guard the gunpowder. After the war Harding wrote the civilian owners of the magazines were never fully compensated for the seizure.

    Herman Hunicke, 4th Missouri Volunteers. Courtesy, Missouri History Museum

    Herman Hunicke, 4th Missouri Volunteers.
    Courtesy, Missouri History Museum

  • Finding of Fact: The large number of potential Unionist volunteers in the city, and the approaching May militia muster at St. Louis, led the Lincoln administration, on April 30, to order Lyon to enroll “in the military service of the United States the loyal citizens of Saint Louis and vicinity, not exceeding with those heretofore enlisted, ten thousands in number”. These formations were to be short term “emergency” units, and would be mustered out after the security threat to St. Louis had abated. Lyon quickly swore in four regiments of United States Reserve Corps (U.S.R.C.) Infantry. These units are usually referred to as (Federal) Home Guard.
    • Despite the enlistment of the Missouri Volunteers and U.S.R.C. units into Federal service, most were far from fully organized or trained. It appears that many volunteers wore “citizens’ clothes”, their only uniform being a rifle, belt and cartridge box. In addition, the majority of these “troops” were scatted around the city, living at home and drilling during the day at a neighborhood “armory”, often a local meeting place such as a beer garden or hall.
    • The force at the Arsenal itself consisted of a handful of Regulars, the 1st Missouri and two companies of the 2nd Missouri.
  • Finding of Fact: More important, the same April 30 order authorized Lyon, “if deemed necessary…by yourself and [the members off the Unionist Committee of Public Safety to] proclaim martial law in the City of St. Louis.” The order was personally authorized by General-in-Chief Scott, Secretary of War Cameron, and President Lincoln.
  • Finding of Fact: On May 2 the General Assembly convened a special session at Governor Jackson’s request to consider issues dealing with state security. The next day the legislature went into “Secret” [closed and confidential] session. The governor’s legislative allies reintroduced proposals from the long contentious “Military Bill” which would have transformed the Militia, boosted spending, and granted the governor sweeping powers. The proponents of the acts argued they were necessary to give teeth to the state’s policy of “Armed Neutrality”. Unconditional Unionists and many Conditional Unionists were very distrustful of Jackson’s intentions, and resisted rising pressure to pass new security bills. As the “Secret Sessions” continued, even Jackson’s Conditional Unionist allies at St. Louis’ [Democratic] MISSOURI REPUBLICAN newspaper grew alarmed at idea of legislating in secret and granting Jackson new powers [while the militia was on duty].
  • Finding of Fact: In late April and early May, MVM Quartermaster General James Harding sent most of the state’s small arms and almost all of its artillery to St. Louis.
  • Finding of Fact: In early May Unionist civilian and Federal authorities became aware that most of the state’s artillery had been shipped to St. Louis and was being stored in the city, including in the Police Headquarters at Arnot’s Building. At least one mounted gun was taken to Murphy’s Wagon Manufactory where the gun was removed from the carriage. This was almost certainly to provide a template for the construction of additional gun carriages, which were subsequently manufactured there.
  • Finding of Fact: On May 3, Judge William M. Cooke completed two days of discussions with Virginia Governor Letcher’s advisory council. He was there at Jackson’s request, carrying out the same mission that Duke and Greene had pursued in Montgomery. He was successful in his request for heavy guns, and the council recommended that Governor Jackson be provided with twenty two guns from the trove seized at Gosport Navy Yard. However, Cooke’s mission would be overcome by events before action could be taken to procure and ship the cannon from Virginia.

    Camp Jackson Courtesy, Missouri History Museum

    Camp Jackson
    Courtesy, Missouri History Museum

  • Finding of Fact: On May 6 the Militia established “Camp Jackson” at Lindell’s Grove on the western edge of St. Louis. The camp was reported to have a holiday feel, with significant overt secessionist display. A significant portion of the 1st Regiment and all of the 2nd Regiment appear to have been secessionist by this time.
  • Finding of Fact: During the subsequent days, heavy militia recruiting and enlistment went on at the MVM’s official recruiting office and at the Minute Men headquarters at the Berthold Mansion. Companies of Police Board “Home Guards” marched to Camp Jackson “for arms and to be drilled”.
  • Finding of Fact: On May 7, the troops of the Southwest Battalion from the Kansas Border, under Lieutenant Colonel Bowen, arrived at Camp Jackson. This included the trained gunners of the Missouri/St. Louis Light Artillery (aka Captain Jackson’s Battery).
  • Finding of Fact: On the May 9, Captains Duke and Greene, and the Confederate siege guns arrived at the St. Louis levee on the steamer J.C. SWON. The boat was met by Major Shaler of the 2nd Regt MVM who took possession of the weapons. The guns, shells, and small arms were loaded onto wagons hired by the St. Louis Police, and under escort of the MVM and police the weapons were hauled to Camp Jackson.
    • Rumors had long circulated the Governor Jackson was procuring artillery from the Confederacy. The arrival of the guns, even though disguised as civilian cargo, became a sensation, with the rumors provoking comment in the next morning’s newspapers.
    • According to a number of different accounts, the Confederate Shipment appears to have included at least:
      • 3 x Thirty Two Pounders
      • (At least) 3 x Twenty Four Pounder “Flank Defense Guns” (iron howitzers)
        • “Five boxes of canister shot, each box containing fourteen shot”
      • 6 x Twenty Four Pounder brass coehorn mortars
        • 300 x “six inch bomb shells”
      • 1 x Ten Inch Siege Mortar with base
        • 96 x “ten inch bomb shells”
      • 800 or 1,200 rifle muskets (depending on report)
    • Note: There is no information that the guns tubes were shipped with carriages, and it is likely that carriages would still have had to have been constructed before the cannon (if not the mortars) could be put into action. This might have been a task for Murphy’s Wagon Manufactury.
  • Finding of Fact: On May 9, Governor Jackson signed a bill passed the previous day, which provided him the authority extend the period of active duty for any militia currently on drill “for such time as he may think necessary”. This meant that while most observers expected Camp Jackson to break up after May 11, the Governor had the authority to maintain the troops there (and at other sites across the state) as a “force in being” indefinably.
    • Note: It is likely that Frost intended several more days, if not weeks of organization, to fill out four state regiments and get his artillerists in order and familiar with the siege pieces [although this must be speculation]. The “Act in Relation to the Volunteer Militia of Missouri” of May 9, 1861 gave the general the legal footing to take his time.
      • Finding of Fact: On May 9, the press announced that General Harney had been reinstated as Commander of the Department of the West, and would be returning, possibly as early as May 11. The secessionist MISSOURI STATE JOURNAL reported the news with pleasure.
    • Note: Lyon’s occupation of the heights above the Arsenal, an act which was contrary to Harney’s policy, was only carried out due to Harney’s temporary removal. Harney’s return had the potential to lead to a second abandonment of the heights, and their occupation by the MVM.
  • Finding of Fact: Several sources state that Lyon carried out a personal reconnaissance of Camp Jackson, verifying the arrival of the Confederate artillery. On the evening of the 9th, he convened a meeting of the Committee of Public Safety to ask for their endorsement for an effort to arrest the militia [before Harney returned]. There was some debate among the members of the Committee, with an argument made that while majority of the militia might be disloyal, the militia muster was legal within the traditional six day window specified by law. There was also the suggestion that the Confederate artillery was an issue of stolen property, best handled by the U.S. Marshal, rather than as a military threat.
    Captain Nathaniel Lyon

    Captain Nathaniel Lyon

    • Note: Lyon’s specific counter-argument is not recorded, but his later letter to General Frost likely provides a window into his thinking. The MVM at Camp Jackson (certainly Frost, Bowen, and the 2nd Regiment) were openly hostile to the U.S. Government, were in communication with Confederate Authorities, were in possession of Confederate “materials of war”, and had engaged in “plotting at the seizure of its [the U.S.] property and the overthrow of its authority.” Because President Lincoln had already ordered the disbandment of disloyal military formations in his April 14 proclamation, Frost’s command was unlawful, and could, and should be broken up.
    • Apparently though, the issue which finally won the agreement of the Committee for action against Frost’s command was the news that General Harney was about to return. It is unlikely that any of the members had confidence in his ability to manage the threat posed by Jackson and Frost. In the end, it was this issue which led to unanimous agreement to arrest the militia.
  • Finding of Fact: On the evening of 9 May, St. Louis Police “scouts” (and others) observed Federal preparations the following mornings action. The St. Louis Police Board was informed, and they passed a warning of a probable Federal attack to General Frost, with the recommendation that he act immediately (although no order was given to disperse, preempt, or prepare to resist).
    • Despite this warning, Frost took no action on the night on 9 May or the morning of 10 May. He did not even warn his command of the possibility of a Federal attack.
  • Finding of Fact: On May 10, the MISSOURI REPUBLICAN reported that a new artillery unit, the St. Louis Light Artillery, Company “B”, had been formed. The new gunners had drawn a cannon from the “Police hall on Chestnut street” and marched to Camp Jackson.
    • The same report stated that the new companies had increased the number of state troops available in St. Louis to 1,400.
    • This did not include the 600-1,000 men that secessionist Colonel Thornton Grimsly claimed to have in his parallel city-wide Constitutional Guard paramilitary organization.

      Captain Emmett McDonald, MVM

      Captain Emmett McDonald, MVM Captured at Camp Jackson and refused to give his parole.

  • Finding of Fact: While the Federal forces moved with significant coordination (considering the green status of most of the troops and officers) they did not succeed in surrounding the camp simultaneously. A number of militiamen appeared to have escaped. Similarly, since Camp Jackson was adjacent to the city, significant numbers of men were away from camp on passes, visiting or at other duties. Less than half of the men expected were captured (689 militia).
    • Similarly, Thornton Grimsley’s Constitutional Guards and the Police Board “Home Guards” were likely not present (having their “armories” scattered across the city), but did have the opportunity to mass at the Camp Jackson and along the line of march back to the Arsenal. While this latter is not definitive these secessionists at-large likely provided heat to the situation, making the subsequent violence more likely.
  • Finding of Fact: Governor Jackson subsequently lied to his own constituents and supporters, denying coordination with the Confederacy, and claiming that the Federal raid was an unprovoked attack on Missouri’s sovereignty and an act of murder. While he had lost almost all his military power, he did succeed in getting the frightened and angry members of the General Assembly to pass bill providing him with (potentially) sweeping new powers….but that it a story for later.
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The Missouri Secession Crisis Project: An Introduction

Investigationes Missourienses: The Missouri Secession Crisis Project
The contested state of Missouri was the site of the United States’ longest civil conflict, stretching from 1854 well into the mid-1870’s. While the state’s experience with violence began with pro-slavery militancy in Kansas, Missouri’s long “Inside War” (its infamous guerrilla conflict) and devastating conventional war grew from obscure political and military maneuvering during the first few months of 1861. The events of this period have been the subject of long discussion, but these efforts have been handicapped by contradictions in post-war histories and the absence key primary sources: destroyed; lost; or overlooked.
The Missouri Secession Crisis Project has been an archival research project to uncover the origins of Missouri’s “civil war within the Civil War”, to help scholars and citizens understand why the state’s internal struggle was so vicious, so hard to end, and so shrouded in mystery.
The Jackson-Frost Conspiracy: America’s 1st attempted military coup …..a plot that no one has ever heard of.
Here at the end of the Civil War Sesquicentennial, it is a fitting time to discuss the preliminary findings of a major research project exploring an important but under-examined aspect of the American Civil War.
Since 2009, the Missouri Secession Crisis Project has attempted to understand the outbreak of war in the U.S.’s “Most Divided State”. During the Civil War itself, the state had two governors, two legislatures, two bodies of “regular” state troops contending in the great battles of the Western Theater, two militia forces, guerrillas and state-controlled counter-guerrillas. The social fabric of the Missouri was torn and the state became a byword for violence and disorder.
The mystery of Missouri, is the question of how this bloodbath “Inside War” was triggered. The standard historical narrative holds that the conflict was the result of one man’s fanaticism, of Federal bungling, and that civil strife that could have been avoided.

Lyon_CWMO

Captain Nathaniel Lyon Courtesy of the Missouri History Museum

Nathaniel Lyon: The Villain of the Piece?
According to the generally accepted understanding of Missouri state history, despite a growing tide of violence during the pre-war years, and despite a strong constituency for secession among militarized veterans of “Bleeding Kansas” cross-border violence Missouri could have avoided internal conflict. In March 1861 the people of Missouri…through a State Convention….. rejected secession and civil war. Further, the common narrative holds that the state government, led by a man (Governor Claiborne Fox Jackson) associated with extreme (and even militant) pro-slavery activism, accepted this decision, establishing the possibility that Missouri would be spared the worst of the coming Civil War. Finally, this historical narrative states that this chance for peace was thrown away when Federal forces under Captain Nathaniel Lyon attacked the camp of the legally assembled Missouri Volunteer Militia (MVM) outside of St. Louis on May 10, 1861 (in the “Camp Jackson Affair”….or the “Camp Jackson Massacre” depending on one’s outlook). This unwarranted Federal breach of the state’s sovereignty toppled Missouri into the larger war, and triggered a savage “Inside War” between Missourians which might have been avoided.

This standard narrative has proven false.
The Missouri Secession Crisis project has examined over 4,000 period documents and transcriptions (primarily from October 1860-August 1861) to trace the ACTUAL events which precipitated the worst phase of America’s longest civil conflict….the Missouri civil war. The period documents show a train of events far different than those described above. They show that in the conventional historical narrative cause and effect have been inverted, actor and subject reversed, and significant events deleted entirely.
The standard reading of the Missouri Secession Crisis is an extreme example an Agreed and Constructed Narrative. It is a hybrid history (assembled from pre-existing Conditional Unionist and Secessionist narratives) incorporating significant counter-factual elements, and apparently created (like the national Lost Cause Narrative) to served political and social purposes beginning in the late 1860’s. It replaced the wartime (and largely factual) Unconditional Unionist narrative by the late 1870s, and was subsequently written into state, and then national, histories of the Civil War.

Claiborne_fox_jackson

Governor Claiborne Fox Jackson Courtesy of Wikipedia Commons

The Jackson-Frost Conspiracy
In reality, the militarization of the state in early 1861, and the eventual outbreak of violence, was the result of relentless efforts by Governor Jackson and his associates to take Missouri out of the Union regardless of the expressed will of the people. Having failed to achieve secession through a variety of political maneuvers in early 1861, on or around April 10, 1861, Jackson and his military and political advisers agreed to pursue a secret political-military strategy. The governor instructed trusted subordinates in the Missouri Volunteer Militia (MVM) to carry out an attack on Federal forces in St. Louis as soon as practicable. The actual mechanics of the attack were left to Brigadier General Daniel Marsh Frost, commander of the First [St. Louis] Military District of Missouri. The secrecy was aimed as much at Jackson’s Conditional Unionist supporters as Federal forces. Privately the governor considered his Unionist political allies “base submissionist[s]”.
The Jackson-Frost Conspiracy was discussed in the private post-war reminiscences of participants and verified by official correspondence and MVM orders. The plan envisioned the mobilization of the equivalent of four regiments of MVM troops at St. Louis to support the reduction of the U.S. Army command at the St. Louis Arsenal. While the Arsenal was protected by a stone wall and large numbers of semi-trained Unionist volunteers, siege guns mounted on the heights above the riverside facility would dominate the Federal command and its defenders. The vulnerability of the Arsenal to state artillery batteries  was made clear by Federal Brigadier General William S. Harney in an April 17 letter seeking guidance from the War Department. Confronted with heavy artillery the Arsenal was untenable.

Fortification efforts at the St. Louis Arsenal: Harpers Weekly

Fortification efforts at the St. Louis Arsenal: Harpers Weekly

Governor Jackson negotiated a simple quid pro quo with Confederate President Jefferson Davis: the removal of a threatening Federal presence on the Mississippi in exchange for siege artillery that could “batter down the walls” of the St. Louis Arsenal. On April 23, Davis met with Governor Jackson’s envoys at the temporary Confederate capital at Montgomery. The Confederate President gave his enthusiastic support to an attack at St. Louis, promising heavy artillery from the Confederate Arsenal at Baton Rouge. The military support was provided with the understanding on both sides that the attack would be followed by Missouri’s rapid secession and the state’s entry into the Confederacy. It must be said that from a variety of sources it appears that Governor Jackson’s associates led Davis to believe that the population of Missouri was eager for secession, and was they were only prevented from expressing their views by the coercive presence of Federal forces.
On May 9, 1861 a large train of Confederate siege guns….more powerful than anything available to the Federal forces at St. Louis…landed at the city’s commercial levee and was hauled (by a combined force of MVM troops and St. Louis police) to the militia encampment, “Camp Jackson” on the western edge of St. Louis.

24 Pounder Howitzer

CSA 24 Pounder Howitzer

Much was left to do however before the attack on the Arsenal could be carried out. Carriages had to be assembled for the siege guns, and hundreds of secessionist volunteers had to be mustered into new MVM companies and regiments. But the initiative appeared with the Militia. If the Federal authorities at the Arsenal waited, Frost’s troops could decapitate the U.S. Army command at leisure. Secessionists were also cheered by reports that General Harney, who had previously refused to allow patrolling outside the Arsenal grounds, was expected to return to command as early as May 11.
It was this last fact that triggered a Federal response to the long-developing secessionist conspiracy. Harney had pursued an accommodating policy with Frost, even though he had believed an attack on his position was being planned. In mid-April Harney had ordered the heights above the Arsenal NOT be occupied by Federal outposts, and there was every reason to believe Harney would order this key ground surrendered to Frost’s men once he returned. However, in Harney’s absence President Lincoln had specifically deputized Lyon (as interim commander at St. Louis) and a board of Unionist civilian advisers with the power to declare martial law in the city. On the evening of May 9th, Lyon met with the members of this civilian “Committee of Public Safety”. Faced with the arrival of the Confederate artillery and the fact that Harney’s return would likely preclude any future possibility of preemption…. and compromise the Arsenal defenses….all agreed to the immediate arrest of the Militia.
The next morning (May 10) Federal forces surrounded Camp Jackson and captured about 689 militia (less than half the total) and most of the Confederate artillery. With over 1,000 secessionist militia and volunteers at large in the city, it was likely inevitable that violence would break out, and at least 28 (mostly civilians) were killed in several spasms of gunfire along the line of march back to the Arsenal.
The capture of Camp Jackson was a military catastrophe for the Governor Jackson. He had ordered the majority of Missouri’s state arms to St. Louis where Lyon captured them along with the priceless Confederate siege batteries. Likewise, the majority of Missouri’s best militia companies had been captured, and the state’s metropolis was under direct Federal control. Worse, General Harney surprised most, by grudgingly endorsing Lyon’s actions, even while regretting the loss of life. Commenting on Frost’s overtly secessionist militia, and the Confederate arms at Camp Jackson, Harney proclaimed: “No government in the world would be entitled to respect that would tolerate for a moment such openly treasonable preparations”.
Faced with such a military (and political) disaster, most men would have abandoned the secession project, but Claiborne Jackson did not. Claiming Lyon’s raid as an unprovoked attack on the peaceful troops of a sovereign state, the governor succeeded in convincing an alarmed General Assembly (convened as part of the prior plan to attack the Arsenal) to pass a raft of laws to provide him money, troops and dictatorial political power. The only things he lacked were troops and arms.

Agreed and Constructed Narrative
In the fullness of time, the majority of Missourians would turn against Jackson (especially after damning documents were captured and published in state newspapers), but the damage to state unity was done. The failed attack plan, while successfully preempted, helped tumble Missouri into internal war. During and after the war three narratives (Unconditional Unionists, Conditional Unionist, and Secessionist/Confederate) would contend with varying success. The battle for narrative in Missouri would focus on these early events….on “war guilt”, and the assignment of responsibility for setting off the “Inside War”. During the war, most Missourians agreed it was Jackson and his men who had destroyed the state. But after the war, with the rise of a Democratic/ex-Confederate political alliance, a new hybrid of the Conditional Unionist and Secessionist arose. This constructed narrative exculpated (and facilitated the reenfranchisement of) ex-Confederates, and shifted the blame to the (by then) dead outsider Lyon, and Missouri’s politically weak ethnic German population (which had provided the majority of early-war Federal volunteers).
Missouri: The Apotheosis of Lost Cause Narrative Reconstruction

It is this dynamic, an extreme example of the process of generating a counter-factual Agreed and Constructed Narrative, that makes the Missouri Secession Crisis….and Missouri’s post-war violence….of potential interest beyond the community of Civil War historians and scholars of American History. Major events which were subjects of public discourse and press reporting in their time were effectively written out of history, for political advantage for some and to achieve final conflict termination for all.
While the Secession Crisis Project has carried out exhaustive archival research to identify the facts about the beginning of Missouri’s war, a similar and more difficult effort will be required to understand the creation of the Agreed Narrative assembled and internalized after the mid-1870s as part of final conflict termination.

Presenting the Evidence
The statements above are bold ones, and extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof. While I am preparing scholarly papers on the various issues touched on, it is important for other scholars to be able to consider and discuss the period source materials that have helped us understand the events in “The Most Divided State” and how its history became obscured. In make that happen I will be presenting original documents, transcriptions and discussions of materials here, so that other scholars can follow the materials though the Secession Crisis. Shear volume will prevent all the materials from showing up here at Civil War in the West, but key documents will allow readers to follow the various actors as they make move and counter-move in Missouri.
In addition to understanding the Jackson-Frost Conspiracy and some of the first fighting in the Civil War, the documents provide important hints about other questions. Why did Jefferson Davis refuse to authorize a CSA advance into Missouri in 1861 (despite Jackson’s pleas that he do so)? Why did Missouri’s UNIONISTS engage in such vicious political fighting during the war? Why did the Missouri State Convention (composed mostly of conservative slaveholders) order the removal of Governor Jackson, the abolition of the Jackson’s Missouri State Guard, and the dissolution of the sitting Missouri General Assembly? Why was the intra-Missouri guerrilla war so vicious? Why did former Conditional Unionists turn on their wartime (Unconditional Unionist) partners and embrace ex-Confederates after the war? But those are discussion for later.
Thanks, Ahead of time.

Acknowledgments
Before closing I must thank some important people who have encourage and assisted this effort:
• Randy McGuire, PhD, of Oak Hills Christian College and former Assistant Archivist at St. Louis University’s Pius XII Library. The acknowledge expert on the St. Louis Arsenal, and my first collaborator.
• Professor Louis S. Gerteis, of the University of Missouri-St Louis, a mighty scholar and the author of the excellent The Civil War in Missouri: A Military History
• Professor Dennis K. Boman of Ashland University, author of Lincoln and Citizen’s Rights in Civil War Missouri and a peerless resource in discussing the political environment in Civil War-era Missouri.
• Professor Adam Arenson, of Manhattan College, a generous and supportive mentor and editor and author of the exceptional Great Heart of the Republic: St Louis and the Cultural Civil War
• Professor David Murphy of St. Louis University, a dear friend for life and an wise guide always
• Mr. John Dougan, a peerless advocate for the past, its importance in understanding the present and its role in making the future. He has been a constant encouragement and help in all my scholarly efforts. The staffers at the Missouri State Archives are extraordinary, skillful and worthy custodians of the state’s history.
• The staff at the Archives of the Missouri History Museum in St. Louis. Its specialized collections are a matchless national resource and they are expert and energetic guides.
• Professors David Jacobson and Derek Harvey of the Global Initiative on Civil Society and Conflict at the University of South Florida. They welcomed me into their family of scholars at the Global Initiative, and helped me sharpen my understanding of the role of Agreed and Constructed Narrative in Post Conflict Societies. They also hectored me into getting off the mark, and begin publishing these materials. ;
• All the other archivists, scholars and custodians of our history at: the National Archives; the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library; the Illinois State Archives; the St Louis City and St. Louis County Public Libraries; the Memphis Public Library, the Duke University Library; Houghton Library, Harvard University; and the National Park Service Archives at Wilson’s Creek, Ft. Donelson, Shiloh, Corinth, and Vicksburg National Battlefield Parks.

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Anouncement! The Missouri Secession Crisis Project

!!Conspiracy and Treason against the General Government and the State of Missouri!!
!Plot to attack the Arsenal and carry the state into the Rebellion!
!!Rebel Arms Seized!!
!!Attempted Coup D’état in America!!
General Frost and Disunionist Militia Captured by Loyal Troops!
!!Riot and Murder in the Streets of the St. Louis!!

The Missouri Secession Crisis Project is has been underway since 2009, examining thousands of period documents to understand the origin of the Civil War in the “most divided state”. On Sunday, May 24, we will begin presenting the preliminary results of this six year archival research project here……at http://www.civilwarinthewest.com. The particulars found in the period documents are often sharply different than those in the post war histories, and provide a clear picture of participants’ motivations and the cause and effect of previously confusing events.
The Project has concluded that in April and May, 1861 the pro-secession Governor of Missouri, Claiborne Fox Jackson, and leaders of the Missouri Volunteer Militia (MVM), planned and attempted to use military force to overturn the decision of the State Convention rejecting secession. If the Jackson-Frost Conspiracy had not been preempted by Federal action it had every chance of success…potentially changing the course of the Civil War. It was also arguably America’s first (and so far only) attempted military coup.
Such an exceptional claim must be supported by strong evidence. While a series of articles covering various aspects of the Missouri Secession Crisis is planned, the evidence will be provided immediately. An array of period documents, transcriptions and discussions will be presented over the coming weeks and months. This will allow scholars to immediately begin considering the evidence, discussing how war came to the “most divided state”…….and how the true story of that tragedy was edited from history after the war.
Join us here beginning May 24

Governor Jackson

Governor Jackson

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Back from overseas

Dear Civil War scholar friends, I have recently returned from an extended period overseas, and am resuming my posts here. A major project will be the presentation of research and documents dealing with the Missouri Secession Crisis….the initiation of the Civil War in the Western Theater, and the Federal government’s first (if mixed) military successes.

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Bird’s Eye View of Cairo, Illinois: Key Federal Outpost

Bird's Eye View of Cairo, and junction of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers

Bird’s Eye View of Cairo, and junction of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers

Cairo [pronounced locally as “Kay-roh”], at the southern-most point of Illinois, was one of the key strategic locations for the first two years of the Civil War.

A muddy and rough riverport, Cairo lay at the junction of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, and potentially held the key to entering the Western Confederacy by water… up (or down) the Ohio and then into Kentucky and Tennessee by way of the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers.  It was also a key rail junction, the southern terminus of the Illinois Central Railroad.

From the earliest days of the war, its military value had been clear and it had been garrisoned and fortified, first by the Illinois militia (rushed down on the Illinois Central), and later by an astounding assortment of Army and Navy forces based at “Fort Defiance” under Brigadier General U.S. Grant (commander of the District of Cairo).

By late 1861, the early Illinois troops would be joined by thousands more, and a fleet of ironclad river gunboats constructed by engineering genius James B. Eads. There the Federals engaged in a stand-off, and light sparring, with a Confederate army under General Leonidas Polk. In early ’62, Grant’s amphibious host, swollen by a fleet of transport steamers from St. Louis, would ascend the Ohio to begin the successful attacks on Forts Henry and Donelson, which would crack open the defense-line of the Western Confederacy and flank Polk out of his defenses.

The map is an extraordinary one. 19th Century maps can be artistic as well as informative, and this wonderful piece more than most. In the 1850s and 60s illustrator John Bachmann created a number of astonishing “Bird’s Eye” depictions of towns and regions, and here he gives the junction of the two mighty rivers his unique treatment. He defies convention by putting south at the top of the image, with the Mississippi entering from the bottom right, and the Ohio from the bottom left, to converge at Cairo, and them ascend south up (!) past Memphis towards the far off Gulf of Mexico.

Bachmann gives us a busy mix of the natural and man-made with streams, bluffs, swamps and groves, dotted with named towns and criss-crossed with road, rail, and bridges. Steamers ply the waters and Tennessee and the Cumberland…targets of Grant’s invasion in a year’s time… reach off to the left from either side of Smithland, KY.

Levee-bound Cairo is in the center foreground, with its shipyard suburb or Mound City, destined to be the headquarters of the Western Gunboat Flotilla (later the Mississippi River Squadron). Just south of Cairo is (on the left) Columbus, KY and around a short bend (to the right) Island No 10 and New Madrid, MO. All would be occupied by the Confederacy, and Columbus’ towering heights would be fortified by the CSA as the “Gibraltar of the West”. This vaunted outpost was destined to be flanked by Grant in February, 1862 and abandoned without a fight.

All that is in the future here though. Bachmann shows us Cairo and the great confluence, in the last moments of peace in 1861. He also shows us all of the terrain…human, terrestrial, and riverine…which would define the War in the West in the crucial early months of 1862.

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Missouri Battle Flags: Confederate and Federal

"Veterans Flag" of the 1st Regiment Missouri Cavalry Volunteers

“Veterans Flag” of the 1st Regiment Missouri Cavalry Volunteers

The state of Missouri is unusual, in that it fielded a large number of both U.S. and CSA units of state volunteer troops.  At the link below you can examine infantry, cavalry and artillery flags from Missouri units on both sides of the “Brother’s War” in addition to the personal flag of Confederate General (and later Missouri Governor) John Sappington Marmaduke and the captured flag of the “Beauregard Rifles” (possibly the flag of Company “A”, 9th Alabama Infantry”).

The flags, often with major wear and battle damage bear a variety of battle honors, including most of the great battles of the Western Theater, including Ft Donelson, Shiloh, Corinth, and the many battles of the Vicksburg, Chattanooga, and Atlanta Campaigns.

Many also bear the names of lesser known fights from Missouri’s bitter “civil war, within the Civil War”, fought between Missourians as they struggled for control of the state:  Black Water, Silver Creek (Roan’s Tan Yard), Lone Jack and Neosho.

Unique flags include the green regimental color of the 7th Missouri Infantry, the “Irish Seventh”, one of two officially ethnic Irish regiments of Missouri volunteers during the war. Although badly damaged, it is still easy to see why it was considered one of the most beautiful flags produced during the war. The obverse shows a golden sunburst, behind a wreath of shamrocks, charged with a golden Irish harp and a wolf hound. The reverse shows the sunburst and a golden dawn, with the Gaelic war cry “Faj an Bealac!” [a variant transliteration of Faugh an Bealac], meaning “Clear the Way!”

Of special interest are the special “Veterans” flags issued to by the (Unionist) state government of Missouri to units which reenlisted at the end of three years service. The blue flags bear the state arms (rather than the Federal eagle) in gold, with the word “Veterans” and the unit designation on the reverse. These flags tell a story of the contest for legitimacy, and the Unionist’s claim to recognition as the lawful government of the state. At the beginning of the war, the secessionist Missouri State Guard had designated a blue flag with the state arms in gold (the unofficial state flag in common use) as the State Guard battle flag. By issuing Federal veteran units the state flag in its own name, the Unionist government of Provisional Governor Hamilton Gamble was making the public statement that his administration, not the government-in-exile of Missouri’s Confederates, was the legitimate government of Missouri.

As for Missouri’s Confederates, they are represented as well, with both the “starry cross” of the commonly known Confederate battle flag, and examples of “Price’s Flag” (aka the “Missouri Battle Flag”) popular with many Missouri Confederate regiments in the later part of the war (a blue flag, bordered in red, with a white Latin cross near the fly).

1st Regiment Missouri Cavalry (Dismounted), CSA

1st Regiment Missouri Cavalry (Dismounted), CSA

So, click on the link below, and enjoy the fine work the conservators in Missouri are doing, and all the great things the state staff and volunteers in Missouri are doing to preserve and publicize the history of America’s most divided state.

http://cdm.sos.mo.gov/cdm4/browse.php?CISOROOT=/cwflag

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Civil War Trust announces 2013 Photo Contest winners

Civil War Trust announces 2013 Photo Contest winners

[Click link above to check out the wonderful photos]

The Civil War Trust has announced the winners of its 2013 Photo Contest. Jointly sponsored with the History Channel and the Center for Civil War Photography [ http://www.civilwarphotography.org/ ] the contest features photographers engaging and interpreting historic Civil War-related sites, often in new and interesting ways.

Enjoy!

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Hempstead Rifles, Co “B”, 3rd REGT Arkansas State Troops

3rd REGT Arkansas State Troops

Shortly after passing Arkansas’ Ordnance of Secession, the Arkansas Secession Convention created the “Provisional Army of Arkansas”, commonly known as the Arkansas State Troops. These forces cooperated with (and fought along side) Confederate Forces, but were ultimately under Arkansas state control.

The Hempstead Rifles was a local militia company, raised in Hempstead County in southwest Arkansas. This photo shows the “Rifles” parading in Washington, Arkansas on May 4, 1861, having just received a locally made Confederate flag [1st National Pattern] , visible near the center rear of the company.

[click through twice on photo for close-up]

The volunteers are mostly dressed in improvised uniforms, based on “militarized” civilian clothes. Many wear home-made “battle shirts” popular among western Confederates early in the war. The battle shirt was a roomy overshirt, often with two breast pockets, decorated with fabric tape (in a contrasting color), particularly along the collar, cuffs, and front placket. Despite their lack of training, and (to us) unconventional (if not unmilitary) appearance, the volunteers would distinguish themselves in battle.

The Hempstead Rifles, under their Captain, John R. Gratiot, were subsequently combined with other local militia companies into a regiment which became the 3rd Regiment Arkansas State Troops. Gratiot was promoted and made Colonel of the Regiment.

The 3rd Arkansas joined a mixed force of Confederate regiments, Arkansas State Troops, and (secessionist) Missouri State Guards under Confederate Brigadier General Ben McCulloch. On August 10, 1861 they fought in the Battle of Wilson’s Creek, about 10 miles south of Springfield, Missouri.

The battle, popularly known as the “Bull Run of the West”, was a vicious one and (depending on ones point of view) resulted in a Confederate tactical victory. The Third Arkansas fought well, but paid a heavy price, suffering 109 casualties (including 25 killed) in the 500 man unit.

After the battle the regiment, along with the other Arkansas State Troops, returned to Arkansas. Provided the opportunity to enter the Confederate Army as a unit, the regiment voted to disband instead. Many of the members of the regiment subsequently joined other Confederate units.

[Photo courtesy of the Wilson’s Creek National Battlefield]

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The Anaconda Plan (and much more) in period imagery

Image

The Anaconda Plan, is the (retrospectively) un-ironic name given to the much modified but eventually successful Federal Grand Strategy to win the Civil War.

The (very) rough outlines of the plan were sketched out by U.S. Army General-in-Chief Brevet Lieutenant General Winfield Scott in May of 1861.

Image

General Scott envisioned a grand envelopment (a crushing Anaconda in the public mind) which would divide, isolate, and economically cripple the seceded states. Scott wished to avoid a “war of conquest” if possible, so he called for a naval blockade to isolate the seceded states from foreign markets and imported goods. His main military action was to be a huge offensive down the Mississippi River, seizing key points along this strategic artery to put in under Federal control all the way down to the Gulf of Mexico.

“The object being to clear out and keep open this great [riverine] line of communication in connection with a strict blockade of the sea-board, so as to envelope the insurgent States and bring them to terms with less bloodshed than by any other plan.” [LTG Winfield Scott letter to MG George McClelland, May 21, 1861]

Scott did not wish to have to force the “insurgent States” back into the Union as “conquered provinces”, and he believed that there was significant “latent Unionism” in the seceded states which might be rekindled (a view Lincoln shared at the time). Isolation from foreign markets, a drought of luxuries, and economic collapse might, in Scott’s mind, bring many of the insurgents back into the U.S. with a minimum of destruction.

At the time Scott’s concept was widely derided. The label “Anaconda Plan”…or “Scott’s Great Snake”….came from enemies of the Plan, or of the Administration. Unionist fire-brands who supported a more direct “on to Richmond” strategy dismissed it as passive and weak. Peace Democrats and Confederate commentators dismissed it as doomed to fail, and as foolishly underestimating Confederate determination to break away.

In the end, Scott DID underestimate the Confederate will to fight and willingness to accept privation to achieve independence. The Confederate population proved willing to not only forgo luxuries, but bore up under economic collapse and serious food shortage. Still, Scott was right that the blockade would be a key to victory, and that a long complex campaign on the Mississippi (far from the dueling capitals) would be vital to eventual success.

Scott also saw something that few did at the time: that it would be a hard, LONG war. At the time of the plan’s origination, most Federal volunteer troops were “Three Months Volunteers”, mustered for 90 days service under the Militia Act of 1795. Scott had little use for the Three Months Men, as they could hardly be armed and partially trained before them would be mustered out. His main hope for these short-term volunteers was that they might receive some military instruction during that period, so they could be more useful as recruits for future “Three Year Regiments”. At the time, many commentators, North and South, still believed the war would be over in a matter of months.

Scott’s plan for the (Anaconda-like) slow crushing of the Confederate economy, was eventually put into place, although with the addition of the conquest and attrition Scott hoped to avoid.

The wonderful graphic of “Scott’s Great Snake” presents a great Federal “Anaconda” …studded with Navy ships…..wrapping around the southern states, and curling around to plunge, snake head-first down the Mississippi. It was created by J. B. Elliott of Cincinnati in 1861.

But in addition to the Great Snake there are numerous other miniature images, often commenting on current (to 1861) views of states or recent events. The snake’s tail is anchored to an American Flag at Washington, topped with a liberty cap.

A enthusiastic zouave, in puffy red pants, charges out of New York, as a winged helmet emblazoned “Free Trade” hovers overhead.

Maryland declares “We give in” as a bridge burns on the MD/VA border.

A West Virginian defends “The Old Flag” with a sword, as the rest of Virgina is symbolized by a battered bee hive, topped with a tattered Confederate Flag [First National pattern] hanging from a broken staff.

A North Carolinian notes that pine rosin is “Poor Eating”, while “Contrabands” escape slavery in South Carolina.

The Georgian cotton factory is abandoned and wrecked, while a lone Floridian sits in a swamp.

A proud Alabamian is angry that “Dam old Virginai took our Capitol”, because the CSA capitol was transferred from Mongomery, AL to Richmond. :-(

Some of the cartoons are grim or horrible. Rebelling slaves (apparently) are “burning massa out” as a plantation burns. In Louisiana a “Union Man” is hung while locals complain that they can’t ship out their cotton. Next door in Texas  a planter shoots fleeing slaves, noting  it is “costly shooting $100,000 a head”

Kentucky….wearing a coonskin cap…. perches on the fence, trying to maintain “Armed Neutrality”

Tennessee is divided, with the Unionist  “Knocksville [Knoxville] Whig” [Newspaper] leading East Tennesseans in defending the American Flag. In West Tennessee a secessionist in a cocked hat looks for threats across the Mississippi.

Scott's Great Snake-Jackson

There, the Great Snake is chasing out Missouri’s secessionist Governor, Claiborne Fox Jackson (the fleeing jackass), while an over-armed Arkansan wields two Bowie Knives and wearing two muskets over his shoulders.

A native chief smokes a pipe in Indian Territory [Oklahoma today], while in “Kanzas”, marching feet make “Union Music”. A second battalion of “Hawk-Eye Marksmen” march south, while a cannon points south from the Federal redoubt at Cairo [pronounced Kay-Roh] Illinois, where Ft Defiance guards the junction of the Ohio and the Mississippi.

A detailed examination of “Scott’s Great Snake” can be made at the Library of Congress:

http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/map_item.pl?data=/home/www/data/gmd/gmd370/g3701/g3701s/cw0011000.jp2&style=gmd&itemLink=r?ammem/gmd:@field%28NUMBER+@band%28g3701s+cw0011000%29%29&title=Scott%27s%20great%20snake.%20Entered%20according%20to%20Act%20of%20Congress%20in%20the%20year%201861%20by%20J.B.%20Elliott%20of%20Cincinnati.

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150 years ago: Railroads west to Tennessee

Here is a great article from the excellent Blog: TO THE SOUND OF THE GUNS. The author, Mr. Craig Swain, discusses a spectacular feat of Federal railroad logistics,

In brief the story is this. In August of 1863, Federal Major General William Rosecrans had skillfully maneuvered his Army of the Cumberland to drive Confederate General Braxton Bragg out of Chattanooga, Tennessee, a key railroad junction and a key to north Georgia.

After the battle, Confederate President Jefferson Davis ordered two corps from Robert E. Lee’s (Eastern Theater) Army of Northern Virginia transferred by rail to support Bragg. Their commander Lt General James Longstreet came with them.

On Sept 19, Rosecrans and Bragg’s Army clashed again, along Chickamaugua Creek, south of Chattanooga. The first day’s fighting was inconclusive, but Longstreet’s corps were available to reinforce Bragg’s force for the second day’s fighting.

The battle developed slowly, until Rosecrans ordered troops moved to fill a non-existent gap in his line….in inadvertently creating a REAL gap. Longstreet lead an attack into the gap, smashing the Federal right, and driving one third of the Federal army….including Rosecrans….out of line and back towards Chattanooga. The Army of the Cumberland was saved by the stubborn defense of elements of the center and right of the army, lead by Major General George Thomas, who earned the nickname “The Rock of Chickamaugua”.

Despite the heroic stand, it was still a retreat, and the previously successful Army of the Cumberland found itself besieged at Chattanooga, as Bragg’s troops took up positions on the heights overlooking the strategic city. Rosecrans was exhausted, and probably mentally defeated. Lincoln described him as “confused and stunned, like a duck hit on the head”.

The risk was that now the hard-won city might be lost……along with parts of the besieged Federal army.

This brings us to Mr. Swain’s fine article. On Sept 23 Secretary of War Edwin Stanton proposed sending two corps from the inactive (Eastern Theater) Army of the Potomac to reinforce the Army of the Cumberland (as Jefferson Davis had for Bragg). Historian James M. McPherson relates:
“It would be a trip of 1,200 miles by the routes they would have to take. Stanton had consulted railroad officials and said the twenty thousand men could reach Nashville in five days and Chattanooga in a few more. Mindful of the previous movements by the sluggish Army of the Potomac, Lincoln responded skeptically that they could hardly get from Culpepper [VA] to Washington in five days! [A surface distance of only about 70 miles.]

“In the end Stanton prevailed. The movement began September 24. It when like clockwork, a marvel of organization and coordination between the War Department and several railroads. Eleven days after the start, more than twenty thousand [23,000] men of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps [under Major General Joe Hooker] arrived at the railhead near Chattanooga with their equipment, artillery and horses after a trip of 1,233 miles through the Appalachian and across the unbridged Ohio River twice [!] It was the longest and fastest of such a large body of troops before the twentieth century”

These fresh easterners helped stabilize the position in Chattanooga, although the city remained besieged and supplies remained tight. They proved vital to the subsequent successful campaign to break the siege and drive Bragg back into Georgia. That victory opened up the center of the Confederacy to invasion….but that is another story.

Now read how almost magical transfer was made in the article above……..

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